[sati01]

I must remember that EZpass numbers.
increase of 1.7 million in 34 or less working days (between sep 26th and nov 13th). that is 50,000 a day. at this rate, it could reach 6.5 Million by January 15th 2015. meaning around 1 out of 2 paid conversions needed.

Why would those guys switch to a recurring fee? They already have free silver perpetual licenses.

[morganplus8]

BBRY $10.37 I am patient and I know I am not wrong (not this Time!)
psst: let them talk! the future is against them!

Ironically, the sell-off is likely over! They stopped the rally on Friday, drove it down hard and today they dropped the bomb to cover those shorts. We need to hold the 50-dma ( $ 10.26/shr/US) and base out yet again here.

FYI - When I assured you that you would get another chance to buy back your shares, I DIDN'T MEAN AT THIS PRICE!!! Ha!

[notafanofyou]

http://blogs.barrons.com/techtraderd...rrons&ru=yahoo

Rather, Faucette thinks BlackBerry will end 2016 with just 6.5 million enterprise subscribers paying only $8 per month. He thinks the company may struggle to sign messaging subscribers because, as he sees it, ?new BlackBerry messaging product features largely match what is already available from�other suppliers for free?we are not sure that even 1-2% of the existing BBM base will be willing to pay $12/month for the BlackBerry equivalent of FaceTime.?

Is this moron for real? The $12/month for BlackBerry meetings is totally different from the garbage facetime which BlackBerry does better with BBM video which Btw is also free. This clown should have zero weight on the market with his deception reports. There is an obvious bias of BlackBerry in the US and one can not help to think NSA plays a role in it. His whole analysis or whatever you want to call it is filled with holes so big that even evel knievel would be afraid to jump over.

Posted via CB10

[morganplus8]

BlackBerry: Morgan Stanley Cuts to Sell on Unrealistic Expectations - Tech Trader Daily - Barrons.com

Rather, Faucette thinks BlackBerry will end 2016 with just 6.5 million enterprise subscribers paying only $8 per month. He thinks the company may struggle to sign messaging subscribers because, as he sees it, ?new BlackBerry messaging product features largely match what is already available from�other suppliers for free?we are not sure that even 1-2% of the existing BBM base will be willing to pay $12/month for the BlackBerry equivalent of FaceTime.?

Is this moron for real? The $12/month for BlackBerry meetings is totally different from the garbage facetime which BlackBerry does better with BBM video which Btw is also free. This clown should have zero weight on the market with his deception reports. There is an obvious bias of BlackBerry in the US and one can not help to think NSA plays a role in it. His whole analysis or whatever you want to call it is filled with holes so big that even evel knievel would be afraid to jump over.

Posted via CB10

You are precisely right but all of this bashing is what legalises the trade. They knew he was coming out with the report so they shorted the stock and stopped the rally. Every time someone tried to enter the trade, they shorted against them and took it below TA levels. They now dropped the news and created panic to cover those shorts and they have the article and following market reaction to make the whole process legal in the eyes of the SEC. I thought we were past this garbage but it appears that those 102 MM shorts aren't finished with BlackBerry yet. We have to factor in the shorts again and think about how they will stop rallies in the future.

[bbjdog]

OT: reading material!

Canadian startup Kik Interactive raises nearly $40-million in venture capital (RTGAM)

SEAN SILCOFF

Canada?s rising star in the flourishing global mobile instant messaging sector, Kik Interactive Inc., has completed its biggest financing to date, raising $38.3-million in a deal led by several prominent U.S. venture capital firms.

The Waterloo, Ont. startup also announced its first acquisition, a content-sharing app provider called Relay, and said it has nearly doubled the number of people who have signed up for its service over the past year, reaching 185 million users.

?It?s becoming clear that [instant messaging] is the core application of the smartphone era,? said chief technology officer Chris Best, a 27-year-old University of Waterloo graduate who co-founded the 60-employee company with fellow student Ted Livingston in 2009.

This has been a breakthrough year for mobile instant messaging services, which enable users to ?chat? and share content such as pictures or videos on their smartphones separate from their e-mail and text functions. Facebook Inc. paid $17-billion (U.S.) for WhatsApp, with 600 million users, while venture-backed Snapchat Inc., with more than 100 million users, was reportedly valued at $10-billion in a summer financing. In Korea, two chat firms combined to form Daum Kakao, which commanded a valuation of more than $7-billion on Korea?s KOSDAQ exchange when the combined firm began trading last month.

Meanwhile, BlackBerry Ltd., which invented mobile instant messaging a decade ago with its BlackBerry Messenger (BBM) service, has struggled to remain a player in the space after abandoning and then reviving plans to make its service available on non-BlackBerry smartphones. BBM now has 91 million active users and chief executive officer John Chen is trying to reposition BBM as a messaging tool for executives, pledging to derive $100-million in revenues in its next fiscal year by selling such services as hosting video-conference meetings and handling mobile payments.

Vancouver-based venture capital investor Boris Wertz said chat apps ?appear to still be growing rapidly? and are on track to surpass social networks such as Facebook and Twitter in popularity. But he said consolidation will likely favour Facebook, which not only owns WhatsApp but boasts 500 million users of its own Facebook Messenger service.

?You will only be able to compete if you have a radically different experience or you carved out significant market share in a specific country,? or culture and language, he said. That ?makes you wonder how the Canadian apps will do. I think BBM has a good chance to fade away in the next couple of years and Kik will need to try hard to differentiate around a platform play. But it?s not evident that this will work?

Kik?s sweet spot is the U.S. 13-to-24 year-old market, where Mr. Best said active users spend an average of 97 minutes a week on the app. Despite Kik?s popularity, Mr. Best admitted it is still trying to build a plan to make money.

?We?re a lot further along than we were a year ago,? he said, declining to share any revenue figures. ?We?ve started to look at some of our different routes for monetization for the first time ? The question we?re trying to answer is, ?What is the business model that makes chat a multibillion dollar industry in the U.S. and the rest of the world???

Other chat services sell a range of offerings from virtual ?stickers? attached to messages to mobile payments services. Kik has experimented with selling ?cards,? or customized applets, and has recently started offering ?sponsored chats,? that enable branded content providers like Vice and the boy band One Direction to share specialized content with fans. ?We?ve had some awesome early success? it is a revenue-generating project for us,? Mr. Best said.

With Kik?s latest financing, it has now raised more than $70-million (Canadian), almost entirely from U.S. venture capital firms, including new investor Millennium Technology Value Partners, which has backed Facebook, Twitter and Alibaba Group. Other emerging Canadian tech companies have had similar success raising funds south of the border, including Ottawa e-commerce software company Shopify, Vancouver?s HootSuite and Desire2Learn of Kitchener, Ont.

Kik had a bumpy start after BlackBerry ? Mr. Livingston?s employer when he was a co-op student ? sued the startup in November, 2010, weeks after it signed up one million users in just 15 days. Mr. Livingston had previously told the company, then called Research in Motion, he was launching a BBM-like service for non-BlackBerry devices, promising to abandon his plan if it instead made BBM available on all devices. RIM did not initially object, even inviting Mr. Livingston to a developer conference, only to sue once the Kik platform became popular. RIM later developed its own ?cross-platform? version of BBM, and the two companies settled the case a year ago.

Posted via CB10

[Soumaila Somtore]

Thanks, M+8 as always,
Since 2011 I sold only once (June 2013) but I been adding little by little and averaged down to $10.20. I am not seeing myself selling anything before my 8 years old daughter goes to college, or before the $100 party if that happened first.

Ironically, the sell-off is likely over! They stopped the rally on Friday, drove it down hard and today they dropped the bomb to cover those shorts. We need to hold the 50-dma ( $ 10.26/shr/US) and base out yet again here.

FYI - When I assured you that you would get another chance to buy back your shares, I DIDN'T MEAN AT THIS PRICE!!! Ha!

[Superfly_FR]

uh, gang, thanks for the reading but I must say I'm so against those "moneymakers" that all I would say may be totally out of control. So, I'll finish earlier today (8PM), enjoy a meal with family and probably watch some light moving around on my TV screen, until I get some rest. It'll keep my b@lls warm for next round

Have a nice evening or whatever !
Cheers,
SF

[Bilaal]

I agree, I'm about to visit Cloud 9 with that good good. Steady on, gentlemen.

[Corbu]

Ok, fancy some more reading?

For those of you who want to go more in-depth into that MS report... Hope this helps us understand.

Investment Thesis

• CEO Chen will aggressively cut OPEX to preserve assets, allowing for future optionality.
• Pressure will continue to mount on hardware platforms in the form of both lower pricing and lengthening life cycles, with value creation opportunities primarily in software.
• Company will be unable to gain relevancy in enterprise mobile management software market and will continue to lose enterprise subscribers.

Key Debates

• Can the company stabilize its user base? We are skeptical.
• Will the company be able to achieve ~$600 software & messaging revenue in FY16? We think that number is ambitious as it implies significant ramp in subscribers and ARPU.
• Is there room for a third or fourth independent player in the MDM/messaging platform market? There are already more advanced vendors in the market with proven solutions for heterogeneous device environments.

Potential Catalysts

• Signs of success with its various turnaround initiatives.
• Hypothetical strategic value of the MDM/content management business to large enterprise equipment and/or software companies.
• Breakeven on hardware business.
• Stem losses in subscriber base.

Risks to Achieving Price Target

• Management isn’t prepared to further expand operating expense cuts.
• Free software, security advantages, and refreshed hardware aren’t sufficient to stabilize the user base.
• Liquidation of assets persists at Bear $2 below book values

Analysis

Market expectations appear too optimistic. We believe that the market has largely valued the company based on the assumption that BlackBerry will generate an incremental $250mm in software revenue and an incremental $100mm in messaging revenue during FY16, consistent with the targets set out by BlackBerry CEO John Chen (from roughly $0 today). That kind of ramp implies that the company will exit FY16 (approximately 15 months from today) with new software and messaging revenue on an $800M-$1B annualized run rate. In order to hit that level, if the company hits its recently stated objective of collecting $9/month from enterprise subscribers for secure mobile management and roughly $12/month from messaging, we estimate that the company will need to exit FY16 with roughly 8-10M enterprise subs and another 1M-2M messaging subs. Just on the enterprise subs, that 8-10M subs implies that BlackBerry will not only successfully retain (or recapture) roughly its entire existing enterprise subscriber base—plus more—it will also convince that subscriber base to increase by roughly 3x how much it is paying BlackBerry today.

We are skeptical that BlackBerry will be able to achieve that level of success, particularly with a new product platform, new pricing, new go-to market strategy, and with a still very damaged brand. Our current estimates contemplate that the company will exit FY16 with 6.5mm enterprise subscribers paying ~$8/month (~$470mm of revenue). Similarly, on the surface, gaining 1-2mm messaging subs that are willing to pay up to $12/month might seem like a relatively low hurdle given the current BlackBerry user base of roughly 40mm and the stated active BBM base of 91mm. However, new BlackBerry messaging product features largely match what is already available from other suppliers for free—we are not sure that even 1-2% of the existing BBM base will be willing to pay $12/month for the BlackBerry equivalent of FaceTime.

Security is moving beyond BlackBerry's “just lock it down” approach. Beyond the organizational challenges, we expect that the company is likely to run into product-related objections in the market. In particular, we believe that a significant portion of the BlackBerry’s target market is becoming dissatisfied with its “containerized” approach to enterprise mobility management and security. The way we describe the containerized approach is that it is like an encrypted and secure virtual machine that resides on the device, and within that “mobile VM,” an enterprise is able to control the content that goes to and from the device and what resides on the device. It also allows for a second level of controlled verification to assure that in the event the mobile device is lost or compromised, the content in that container is protected. While that approach is very good for security-sensitive organizations, many are now finding that it comes with significant productivity and usability drawbacks because most new uses require that the “mobile VM” re-spin back up and decrypt itself before being usable. For example, if somebody wants to check her enterprise email in a containerized mobile application, she has to launch the app, enter a discrete password, wait for it to spin up, decrypt, and only then can the device start to pull down email. Other, less intrusive “wrapped” approaches from the likes of MobileIron, Airwatch (now part of VMware), and others integrate with the native mobile systems, and allow for much faster response times and significantly improved productivity—90% of the security without the usage and productivity compromises. While there are certainly organizations that continue to prioritize security above all else, we believe that an increasing proportion of the enterprise mobile management deployments are opting for noncontainerized approaches. Additionally, for those that still want high security, “containerized” solutions, there are other vendors in the market with more experience working with a heterogeneous slate of devices. We expect that BlackBerry, and containerized vendors as a whole, will move to expand the breadth of their offerings to address the market evolution, but we do not expect BlackBerry’s new variations to meaningfully impact its FY16 efforts.

Lots of organizational work to be done. Starting now… One of the larger organization hurdles that we envision for BlackBerry will be its return to a direct sales effort. Company management has said that it plans to move approximately 500 people (about 7% of total BlackBerry employees) into external sales as it expects that it will generate about 40% of FY16 revenue from direct sales. To us, operational change of that magnitude is likely to be disruptive, which in turn typically hurts productivity. And that reassignment process is just now getting underway.

Channel raises hurdles; and channel conflict is coming. The company expects that sales through partners and carriers will make up ~60% of revenue in FY16, which based on typical revenue share arrangements would imply that to hit its $500M in software revenue in FY16, or roughly $250M incremental to FY15, channel partners will need to do about $250M themselves, plus the direct component of roughly another $100 million.

And those amounts are in addition to the commitment of $100M in messaging revenue to which the company has committed. With BlackBerry returning to direct sales effort for the first time in over a decade, we expect that there are likely to be channel conflicts that may prove tough to manage. What we have found with competitors (that currently operate at a much smaller scale than that targeted by the company) is that where there exists channel conflict, the resellers and carriers almost always default to actively selling the non-conflicted product almost exclusively. And we think that will be a key impediment to BlackBerry hitting its indirect sales effort, especially given that all the channels that BlackBerry has identified already offer competing EMM solutions (in addition to currently offering BlackBerry’s older products). In order to overcome that channel friction, we expect BlackBerry will need to generate substantial demand pull in order for the indirect channels to hit the targets laid out by Chen—something we expect will be difficult to achieve given the damaged BlackBerry brand and the increasingly competitive nature of the market.

Hitting targets relies too much on new devices and margins. Part of BlackBerry's plan to get to breakeven EPS and cash flow during FY16 is through improving profitability of handset products substantially. We estimate that the company has been selling handsets at around breakeven (or even negative GM). While we expect that BlackBerry may be able to increase its GM on new handsets to the mid-20’s range (which is typical for low volume producers at the price point BlackBerry is addressing), we do not expect that the company will hit its needed level of 10M units in FY16, particularly as the company has now moved to a sell-through basis for recognition, and is essentially building to order. Our forecast for FY16 is ~8mm units, and we expect handset operations will lose ~$180mm in FY16.

High employee count + service revenue = defensible tangible asset value. One key lever John Chen still possesses to generate value is BlackBerry's substantial number of employees. As shown below, we estimate that the company is spending about half of its OPEX supporting handset development efforts. And if we assume most of the remainder of the OPEX is in support of software development efforts, we find that it is still well in excess of that of comparable companies. To contextualize further, BlackBerry currently has about the same number of employees as Facebook. We would expect that if we get to the middle of FY16, and the company is tracking well behind plan, that Mr. Chen and the rest of the management team will move quickly to further cut expenses. We believe that expenses could likely be cut faster than the service revenue decays, allowing the company to maintain a relatively cash flow neutral operating structure, thereby preserving tangible assets and future optionality for new products and strategies.

Adjusting estimates. Post-analyst day we have made adjustments to our model. We have increased device revenue estimates, estimating about 8mm devices to be sold in FY16 at an ASP of ~$230, an increase from previous estimates of 7.4mm devices at an ASP of ~$200, as product releases of higher ASP devices have been slightly more successful that anticipated. We have decreased services revenue, anticipating larger than previous anticipated subscriber losses, estimating BlackBerry's subscriber base erodes to ~22mm (@ $2.30 monthly SAF) by the end of FY16 from previous estimates of 39mm (@$2.13 monthly SAF). We have added a messaging line item to our income statement in-line with company guidance that the $100mm target for messaging revenue is separate from the $500mm software goal for FY16e and anticipate the company combined will now be able to achieve $466mm of combined software and messaging revenue, increased from the previous $400mm estimate. We also made a change to the calculation of devices revenue, which had been mismodeled, reflecting that BB10 device revenue should be recognized on sell-through vs. sell-in (as BB7 devices are accounted for). Given the deferral of revenue on BB10 devices shipped, but not sold, we have a decrease in FQ3 revenue, but an increase in our FQ4 revenue estimate. Overall, while revenue has increased slightly on account of changes to the model, our EPS estimates have gone down. This is a result of more revenue coming from lower margin devices vs. higher margin service revenue. Our FY15 estimates are now $3,797mm / ($0.21) from $3,787mm / ($0.18), and our FY16 estimates are now $3,264mm / ($0.17) from $3,124mm / $0.09.

Downgrading to Underweight and initiating a $7 price target. We are downgrading our rating to Underweight and initiating a $7 price target (unchanged from our previous base case). When we initially set our Equal-weight rating in June 2014, we felt the market was too pessimistic on the ability of the company to stem the cash burn and EPS losses, especially since we didn’t think that the Street appreciated that much of the cash burn was related to paying suppliers for unmet commitments for handset production in 2013, and that those payments would wind down naturally. However, we now believe that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction, and that the market is now too willing to give the company the benefit of the doubt that BlackBerry will successfully be able to sell its new software and messaging offerings to its remaining enterprise user base while also beginning to recapture lost users. While we acknowledge that there are a wide range of outcomes, we are skeptical and believe that within the next few quarters, the slower than expected take up of new software products will ultimately lead to further cost reduction plans. We are confident that management will be able to retain tangible asset value, and we assign a $7 price target which is approximately 1.5x tangible book value at the end of FY16e, and represents an EV/Sales value of 5x our FY16 software and messaging revenue. We view the ~5x multiple as reasonable as compared with other high growth software names vs. the ~7.5x the market is giving credit for. We exclude expected FY16 service revenue ~$800mm from our valuation as we expect that revenue will serve to maintain asset base even as losses and expense reductions persist.

[...]

Price Target $7 ~1.5x Price to Tangible Book Value at the end of FY16e
(~5x EV/FY16e Software + Messaging Revenue)

Bull $19
2.0x EV/CY15e Sales (4x Price to Tangible Book Value at the end of FY16e)

Meaningful traction of new products. New BES 12 platform and BlackBerry devices gain share, dramatically slowing the erosion of the enterprise subscriber base (20% software growth, 15% devices growth). Combined with good response to new BBM monetization efforts, the company is able to return to earnings early in FY16 (first half of calendar 2015). The EV/sales multiple could expand to 2.0x from the current 0.8x as these positives are factored in. The company would no longer trade primarily on tangible book value and instead would start to trade again on growth based metrics.

Base $7
~1.5x Price to Tangible Book Value at the end of FY16e
(~5x EV/FY16e Software + Messaging Revenue)

Continued cost optimization activities and slowing cash burn. The company arrests its cash burn and moves to cut OPEX further after poor response to its new BES 12 and BlackBerry devices, allowing it to reach and generally maintain cash flow break-even by the end of fiscal 2015 and into fiscal 2016 (early calendar 2015). The company maintains its current asset base, and associated multiple, at 1.5x tangible book value, maintaining turnaround optionality. Grows software & messaging business to a ~$470mm by FY16. 5x EV/16e software & messaging revenue comparable to other high growth software names.

Bear $2
0.7x Price to Tangible Book Value at end of FY16e

Failure to enact aggressive cost-cutting measures if new products fail. New management fails to take aggressive cost cutting even as new product launches flounder and subscriber base continues to erode pushing out cash flow break-even indefinitely. Net tangible book shrinks to the $3/share level by the end of May 2016 and the price/tangible book multiple falling with it, to 0.7x, yielding a value of $2.

I'll try and post some interesting exhibits a bit later...

To those who need to be thanked... thanks!

[Corbu]

And the WSJ...
BlackBerry CEO?s Forecasting Acumen Under Scrutiny - Canada Real Time - WSJ

BlackBerry Ltd. Chief Executive John Chen’s forecasting chops are on the line after Morgan Stanley suggested the Canadian smartphone maker could miss its target for revenue from software sales.

John Chen is forecasting the company will double its software sales to $500 million in its next fiscal year, driven in part by newly formed partnerships with Samsung Electronics Co. and others to help it sell its new BES12 mobile device management software to corporate and government customers. He is also counting on added security, video conferencing and other features to help generate $100 million in revenue from BBM, BlackBerry’s messaging service.

But in note Wednesday, Morgan Stanley suggests those forecasts could be too aggressive, estimating BlackBerry would need up to 10 million enterprise mobile device management subscribers and up to 2 million BBM customers by the end of fiscal 2016 to hit it targets.

“We are skeptical that BlackBerry will be able to achieve that level of success, particularly with a new product platform, new pricing and with a still very damaged brand,” Morgan Stanley analyst James Faucette wrote in a note.

That prompted Morgan Stanley to downgrade its investment rating for the stock to underweight from equal-weight. In New York, the stock recently traded down 4.4% to $10.29, but that’s off its intraday low of $10.06.

Mr. Chen has said the revenue target for software sales is ambitious. But he has built his reputation as a turnaround expert in part on hitting and exceeding financial forecasts. That helped him resurrect Sybase Inc. and sell the once unprofitable California company in 2010 to Germany’s SAP SE for $5.8 billion.

Mr. Chen supporters argue the same strategy is key to his BlackBerry turnaround effort. Further, Mr. Chen is seen as an executive who won’t issue forecasts that he’s not confident he can meet. So far, he has surprised analysts with a quarterly profit and achieved the company’s cost-cutting target ahead of schedule.

But hitting the software sales target is among the executive’s biggest tests yet, since BES12, in particular, is core to Mr. Chen’s plan to reboot revenue growth. For that reason, any miss could be that much more damaging to the stock.

[georg4BB]

More information from that Merrill Lynch report referred to earlier by kadakn01:
...
Execution, handset sales, and SAF revenues still at risk
...
We are not big fans of the Passport design...
...

Oh, really? Interesting...

[W Hoa]

John Chen has a solid reputation for forecasting earnings potential but that doesn't carry much weight with some analysts:

BlackBerry Ltd.BB.T Chief Executive John Chen�s forecasting chops are on the line after Morgan Stanley MS suggested the Canadian smartphone maker could miss its target for revenue from software sales.

BlackBerry CEO?s Forecasting Acumen Under Scrutiny - Canada Real Time - WSJ

[woofster]

So it was a relatively quiet afternoon from 11:30am on. Fast forward to 3pm and the bigger volume selling begins as usual, dragging share price from $10.30 (and a high of $10.39) back down to the $10.14 support level once again. I'd really like to believe the sell-off is over. It may be a sign that it is if we see green after hours and pre-market tomorrow.

[dusdal]

I'm so glad Faucette decided to comment on how bbm meetings is pretty much facetime.

As a bull it gives me comfort knowing his bearish outlook has a distorted basis.

Posted via CB10

[dusdal]

Either he's never used Facetime and believes it's much more than it actually is, or he didn't make it to the investors presentation and has never seen bbm meetings used.

Posted via CB10

[notafanofyou]

So it was a relatively quiet afternoon from 11:30am on. Fast forward to 3pm and the bigger volume selling begins as usual, dragging share price from $10.30 (and a high of $10.39) back down to the $10.14 support level once again. I'd really like to believe the sell-off is over. It may be a sign that it is if we see green after hours and pre-market tomorrow.

I will be surprised if it doesn't close at or near LOD. I see big buys hitting the ask and small sells on the bid to take it lower.

Posted via CB10

[bungaboy]

Here's his actual performance, looking at the reporting periods after his tenure began January 2014. He's either consistently "padding the numbers" or really bad at forecasting costs. Actual sales have fallen short of expectation in the 1st and 3rd reporting periods below. Here's the data to compare for yourself.

Date	Measure: estimated	Measure: actual
March 2014	EPS -.66 EPS Adj -.57 Net Income -346 Net Income Adj -302.15 Sales 1109	EPS -.80 EPS Adj -.08 Net Income -423 Net Income Adj -42 Sales 976
May 2014	EPS -.34 EPS Adj -.25 Net Income -197 Net Income Adj -145 Sales 954.04	EPS .04 EPS Adj -.11 Net Income 23 Net Income Adj -60 Sales 966
Aug 2014	EPS -.23 EPS Adj -.16 Net Income -161.3 Net Income Adj -85.99 Sales 949.77	EPS -.39 EPS Adj -.02 Net Income -207 Net Income Adj -11 Sales 916

I don't remember him giving these figures.

[kfh227]

Bbm meetings only works on iPhones?!?!?

Posted via CB10

[sidhuk]

First Apple now yahoo should buy this Dead company. lol

While Working on Tax Deal, Mayer Eyes Display Acquisitions ? But Will Yahoo Aim Higher? | Re/code

[W Hoa]

Here's his actual performance, looking at the reporting periods after his tenure began January 2014. He's either consistently "padding the numbers" or really bad at forecasting costs. Actual sales have fallen short of expectation in the 1st and 3rd reporting periods below. Here's the data to compare for yourself.

Would you happen to have Chen's projections for the current quarter?

[woofster]

Intraday volume is almost always higher - across the market - in the mornings and with heavy buying/selling into the late afternoon into the close. This is referred to by equity traders as the "smile".

Yes, in the case of BBRY, a smile if you look at the volume chart...or a frown if you look at the 1-day price chart. j/k

[sidhuk]

They are from the quarterly filings, business updates, press releases, comments made on earnings calls, etc. Lot of manual work. Takes forever to track data on that level of granularity. I used data that's widely agreed in the market, there are other estimates he's made that I didn't include...the numbers here you can verify w/ most any major market data vendor.

still, I dont recall JC ever giving those estimated specific numbers.

[ophjacks45]

GSX is a BlackBerry strategic reseller. I've been following them for a while now. If you ever needed a vote of confidence to BlackBerry to make you feel reassured about your investment, please read this blog post by their CEO.

BlackBerry has a strategy.

In particular, these two paragraphs stand out:

Please understand me. We at GSX have the choice of putting our development resources on many platforms, but in this case, we decided to work on BES 12 because we like the “new” BlackBerry. GSX did not ask to get on the BES 12 bandwagon. We were asked by BlackBerry to help, we looked to see if it made sense, and then we made the decision to move ahead.

So, after six months of hard work, let me tell you that we at GSX believe in BlackBerry’s approach. We believe in its ability to execute. We believe in its strategy. And, we cannot wait when all of the products will ship, bringing to you the best combination of mobile enterprise email solutions on the best mobile server platform.

On a day that you have analysts comparing BBM Meetings with FaceTime, it's time for a reality check from the pros.

[bungaboy]

They are from the quarterly filings, business updates, press releases, comments made on earnings calls, etc. Lot of manual work. Takes forever to track data on that level of granularity. I used data that's widely agreed in the market, there are other estimates he's made that I didn't include...the numbers here you can verify w/ most any major market data vendor.

They are your and other's numbers, not John Chen's numbers, then.

[notafanofyou]

The company stated them. Not sure how that makes them mine. I'm sorry they didn't come prepackaged in a news story written on a 3rd grade level. Also, please see my full post - these #'s are widely available from market data sources:

Link please? No link then we don't want to hear made up stories.

Posted via CB10